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COMES NOW, Third Party Plaintiff/Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Roberta Shore
(hereinafter"Roberta Shore"), by and through her attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and
submits this Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in the above-titled matter.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE.
This appeal involves the legal malpractice of Nicholas Bokides (hereinafter "Bokides")
arising from his representation of Roberta Shore during her divorce from William R. Shore
(hereinafter "William Shore"). Roberta Shore's claims against Bokides arise from the failure of
Bokides to notify McCormick International USA, Inc. (hereinafter "McCormick") and Agricredit
Acceptance, LLC (hereinafter "Agricredit") that Roberta Shore would no longer guaranty repayment
of future advances offunds to Bear River Equipment, Inc. (hereinafter "Bear River") based upon her
guarantee. As a result of Bokides' failure to notify McCormick and Agricredit, McCormick and
Agricrcdit sued Roberta Shore on her guaranty and subsequently obtained a judgment against
Roberta Shore in the amount of $342,417.42 for eight (8) tractors and/or loaders financed by Bear
River.
Bokides does not dispute that he failed to notify McCormick and Agricredit, as agreed, or
that his failure/negligence resulted in ajudgment against Roberta Shore. Instead, Bokides attempts
to shift the blame to Roberta Shore and asserts that Robelia Shore failed to mitigate her damages by
failing to pursue a separate legal action against William Shore even though she testified that she
considered such an action, and based upon her finances and her knowledge of William Shore's
finances, determined such an action to be futile. The trier offact, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown,
agreed with Roberta Shore and concluded that Roberta Shore's actions were "taken in the exercise
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of due care" and she did not fail to mitigate her damages. The trier of fact considered the arguments
of Bokides and found that he "did not present sufficient evidence" and did not meet his burden of
proving Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages. Bokides now seeks to not only second guess
Roberta Shore's decisions regarding her ability to fund a separate lawsuit against William Shore, and
her conclusions as to William Shore's assets, liabilities and financial capability of paying a
judgment, but to also second guess the trier of fact's decision that her decisions were reasonable and
with due care. However, there is substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision that
Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigate her damages and the district court's decision should be
affirmed.
The district court also held that the judgment entered against Roberta Shore involving her
guarantee for one of the eight tractors/loaders, which was financed more than five months after
Bokides had agreed to provide notification to McCormick and Agricredit, was not proximately
caused by the negligence/malpractice ofBokides because it was financed prior to the divorce decree
being entered. Roberta Shore has filed a cross-appeal as to this portion of the district court's
decision because she contends that allowing Bokides five to six months to provide notification to
McCormick and Agricredit was not a reasonable time as a matter of law. Bear River was in the
business of financing and selling tractors, loaders and other equipment and it was reasonable to
expect that it would be financing equipment during the divorce. Thus, Roberta Shore respectfully
requests that the district court's decision be reversed with respect to the one tractor financed prior
to the entering of the divorce decree.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION.
Bokides provided a course of proceedings section in his opening brief and Roberta Shore
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does not disagree with the course of proceedings provided by Bokides. Thus, rather than redundantly
restating the course of proceedings Roberta Shore will refer the Court to Bokides' opening brief.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Roberta Shore disagrees with portions of the statement of facts submitted by Bokides. and

therefore, submits her own statement of facts. Furthermore, Roberta Shore would point the Court
to the findings of fact by the district court which also summarize the facts and evidence presented
to the district court during the one day court trial (See R. pgs. 595-613).
1.

McCormick is a manufacturer of farm equipment. In order to market its equipment,

McCormick establishes retail distributor/dealerships with local, but independently owned dealers.
[n 2005, a dealership with Bear River was created for the retail sale of McCormick tractors and other
farm equipment. CR. pg. 149).
2.

In order to finance the acquisition of its inventory from McCormick, Bear River

entered into agreements with Agricredit which were executed by Will iam Shore and Roberta Shore
on behalf of Bear River. Bear River executed an "Inventory Security Agreement" and a "Retail
Financing Agreement" with Agricredit on March 22, 2005. As part of the Inventory Security
Agreement, Bear River granted to Agricredit a limited power of attorney which provided Agricredit
with authority to execute, on behalf of Bear River, certain documents in the normal course of
business, including "Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements." As Bear River ordered farm
equipment from McCormick, the equipment would be financed or "floored" through Agricredit.
Wholesale Financing Agreements would be executed by Bear River through the use of the limited
power of attorney. Once the equipment was sold to the customer, the proceeds of the sale were to
be placed in a trust account, separate and apart from Bear River's other funds.
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3.

On March 22, 2005, William and Roberta each separately executed personal

guarantees in which they unconditionally and absolutely guaranteed any obligation owed by Bear
River to Agricredit.
4.

In July and August of 2007 an audit revealed that Bear River had been selling

equipment financed through Agricredit, receiving proceeds from the sales but failing to apply said
proceeds to its obligation to Agricredit or to placc said monies in a trust account as required by the
agreements with Agricredit.
5.

McCormick and Agricredit had previously entered into an agreement wherein

McCormick reimbursed Agricredit for the amounts financed to McCormick's dealers if Agricredit
was unable to collect monies it had provided for the purchase or flooring of McCormick equipment.
By assignment dated March 14,2008, Agricredit transferred to McCormick all of its right, title and
interest to the obligation owed by Bear River to Agricredit. The personal guarantees referenced in
paragraph 3 were part of the all-inclusive rights assigned to McCormick.
6.

The Guaranty signed by Roberta Shore contained the following provision:
And that this shall be a continuing guaranty, and shall cover all the
liabilities which the Dealer may incur or come under until AAC shall
have received at its Head Office, written notice from the Guarantor
or the executor, administrators, successors or assigns of the
Guarantor, to make no further advances on the security of this
guaranty.

(R. pg. 37,43).
7.

On August 29, 2008 McCormick filed suit against Bear River as well as William

Shore and Roberta Shore in their individual capacities. CR. pg. 1). McCormick moved for summary
judgment on May 20, 2010. (R. pg. 252). McCormick's Motion for Summary Judgment was

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANTS BRIEF - PAGE 4

granted June 10,2010. (R. pg. 408). Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and
Roberta on June 29,2010 in the sum of$319,977.98. (R. pg. 434).
8.

The Judgment related to five (5) tractors and three (3) loaders. The proceeds from

the sale of the equipment were not paid over to Agricredit as required by the Agreements bctween
Bear River and Agricredit. Thc Wholesale Financing Requests and Agreements for each of these
items of equipment are listed and identified in the Affidavit of Kevin Peters and are summarized as
follows:
Serial No.

Model No.

Date Financed

JJE2026767

MC115 Tractor

10/23/06

JJE3337250

MTX135 Tractor

12/21/06

JJE3337193

MTX120 Tractor

12/21/06

7183970

MCQL145 Loader

12/21106

JJE2059356

CXI05 Tractor

1104/07

JJE2058843

CX85 Tractor

3/15007

7217799

MCQL165 Loader

5/29/07

7217796

MCQL 165 Loader

5/29/07

(R. pg. 187, see also Exhibits 203 and 105).
9.

On August 12, 2010, attorney fees and costs were awarded and an Amended

Judgment was entered against Bear River, William and Roberta in the amount of$342,417.42. CR.
pg.477).
10.

In March of 2006, Roberta Shore engaged the services of Bokides to represent her

in a divorce proceeding in Washington County, Idaho, Shore v. Shore Case No. CV 2006-000368.
Roberta Shore advised Bokides of the above-referenced personal guarantee and Bokides agreed to
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notify, in writing, Agricredit that Roberta Shore would no longer be a guarantor for the obligations
of Bear River.

While there has been some dispute around this issue at trial, it is clear Bokides

acknowledged that Roberta Shore asked him to send the letters revoking her guarantee prior to May
of 2006. (Tr. pgs. 13, Ins. 4-22; see also R. pg. 603).
] 1.

Ihe evidence is undisputed that Bokides did not send the letters he promised to send

to Agricredit revoking Roberta Shore's personal guarantee. (Tr. pg. 173, Ins. 5-7). Bokides did not
contact McCormick or Agricredit to determine if removing Roberta Shore's personal guarantee
would negatively impact Bear River's ability to obtain financing in the future. (Ir. pg. 193. Ins. 722). Further, Bokides did not dispute had he sent the letters which he agreed to do before October
23, 2006, Roberta Shore would never have been a party to this action and McCormick/Agri-Credit
would not have obtained the above-referenced Judgment against her. (Tr. pgs. 188-189, Ins 21-1).
12.

Bokides suggests that Roberta Shore failed to mitigate her damages by failing to bring

a cause of action against William Shore. At the time the cause of action was brought against Roberta
Shore, she met with James G. Reid to discuss her options. She was advised of a potential con11ict
and a written waiver of that con£1ict was obtained from both Roberta Shore and William Shore. (Tr.
pg. 21, Ins. 9-20). Roberta Shore independently determined not to make a claim against William
Shore based upon her personal knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and
net worth. (Ir. pg. 21-22, Ins. 21-23).
13.

Roberta Shore testified that having been married to William Shore she was aware of

the assets. liabilities, judgments and pending lawsuits of William Shore. The testimony was also
undisputed that Roberta Shore was also aware of those same assets, liabilities, judgments and
pending lawsuits after the divorce. Jd. In fact, Roberta Shore was a party to some of the lawsuits
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and continues to have a security interest in some of the assets of William Shore.
14.

The testimony at trial was also undisputed that the Divorce Decree (Exhibit 103),

does not specifically state that William Shore will indemnify Roberta Shore for her obligations
pursuant to her guarantees. (Tr. 103-104, Ins. 12-5). The Divorce Decree provides at paragraph VI
that William Shore will indemnify Roberta Shore for "indebtedness related to the closely held
corporation Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc."
15.

As to William Shore's assets, the undisputed testimony was that William Shore has

a negative net worth and William Shore may have to file bankruptcy at some point in the future. (Tr.
pg. I 03. Ins. 1-6). The Financial Statement dated February 26,2010 (Exhibit 113) does not include
the above-mentioned Judgment ofMcCormick/Agri-Credit. (Tr. pg. 99, Ins. 7-18). William Shore's
testimony was that the value of the assets listed on the Financial Statement if sold pursuant to
execution, would be significantly less than the amounts he listed on the Financial Statement he
prepared. (Tr. pg. 101, Ins. 2-13). There was a suggestion at trial that William Shore had offered
to settle the suit with McCormick for $100,000.00 but the undisputed testimony was that William
Shore would have to borrow the money to accomplish a settlement. (Tr. pg. 74, Ins. 10-20).

U. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues asserted by Bokides on appeal can be summarized as follows:
I.

Whether the district court erred in finding that Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigated
her damages?

HI. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
Roberta Shore raises the following issues on cross-appeal:
2.

Whether the district court erred in ruling that Roberta Shore's damages did not
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include the amount due to McCormick for the tractor that was floored on or about
October 28, 2007?
3.

Whether Roberta Shore is entitled to its attorney fees and costs incurred as a result
of this appeal?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the district court's decision, the appellate court's:
decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. A district court's
findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the
judgment entered, in view of the district court's role as trier offact It is the province
ofthe district judge acting as trier offact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony
and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. [The appellate court] will not substitute
[its] view of the facts for the view of the district court. Instead, where findings of
fact are based on substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, those
findings will not be overturned on appeal. [The appellate courts] exercise free review
over the lower court's conclusions oflaw. however, to determine whether the court
correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained
by the facts found.

Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 521,20 P.3d
702, 705 (2001) (citations omitted).

V. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court's Holding that Roberta Shore Did Not Fail to Mitigation Her
Damages is Supported bv Substantial Evidence.
While packaged in a number of different arguments, Bokides' entire appeal is limited to

arguments concerning mitigation of damages. Mitigation of damages is defined by IDJI2d 9.14 as
follows: "Any person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage
and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be
recovered." Idaho courts have consistently held that the burden ofprooflies with the party asserting
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the affirmative defense. More specifically, the burden of proof as to mitigation of damages is on the
party causing the alleged damages, Bokides in this instance. See Davis v. First Interstate Bank, 115
Idaho 169, 765 P.2d 680 (1988); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915, 643 P.2d 1085 eCt.
App. 1982). Thus, the burden is on Bokides to prove that Roberta Shore did not exercise reasonable
care to mitigate her damages.
The district court, relying upon IDJI 9.14 and 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257, 796 P.2d
134 (Ct.App. 1990), found that Bokides did not meet his burden and that Roberta Shore's actions
were taken in the exercise of due care.

As the trier of fact, the district court considered the

testimony of Roberta Shore and William Shore, along with the documentary evidence, and concl uded
that Roberta Shore made a "knowing and intelligent decision based upon her knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding [William Shore's] finances" and that Roberta Shore did not have
alternative remedies which were viable and equivalent. The district court's conclusions were
supported by the testimony of Roberta Shore that she had personal knowledge of the finances of
William Shore arising out of her fifteen year marriage and the finances, and debts, associated with
the dissolution of said marriage.

While Bokides may second guess or question the findings and

evidence, Bokides has not and cannot demonstrate that the district cOUli's findings and conclusions
are not supported by substantial evidence.
1.

Roberta Shore Did Not Have Alternative Remedies which were Viable and
Equivalent.

Bokides argues that the facts and issues presented in 0 'Neil v. Vasseur are instructive to the
case at bar. Interestingly, the district cOUli also found 0 'Neil v. Vasseur insightful in that it provides
if "an attorney's negligent conduct in representing a client leaves the client with an alternative
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remedy or remedies which are both viable and equivalent, the result may be that the client suffers
no loss as the proximate loss ofthe attorneys negligent conduct." ld. at 262. (emphasis added). The
district court found that Roberta Shore did not have alternative remedies which were both viable and
equivalent because "she was faced with the prospect of incurring additional expenses and attorney
fees to pursue what she knew to be a judgment proof individual from her own personal knowledge
arising out of her fifteen year marriage and the finances associated with the dissolution of that
marriage." (R. pg. 610). Thus, to the extent Bokides is relying upon 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, the facts of
this case, as found by the district court, are distinguishable because Roberta Shore did not have
alternative remedies which were viable and equivalent.
Moreover, the case of 0 'Neil v. Vasseur involved a situation in which an attorney failed to
pursue a claim on behalfofthe plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then pursued the claim on their own behalf
and the court found that they properly mitigated their damages. In this case, unlike 0 'Neil v.

Vasseur, the malpractice of Bokides does not arise from his failure to pursue a claim on behalf of
Roberta Shore. This is not a situation where the legal malpractice arises from Bokides' failure to
pursue William Shore. In other words, it is not analogous to 0 'Neil v. Vasseur because the claim
which gives rise to the malpractice is different from the claim which Bokides now suggests Roberta
Shore failed to pursue. In 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, the "viable and equivalent" remedy was to pursue the
claim which the attorney failed to pursue.

In this case, Bokides' malpractice is based upon his

failure to notify McCormick and Agricredit to remove Roberta Shore from the guarantees. Bokides
is not suggesting and there is no evidence to support the argument that Roberta Shore failed to
mitigate her damages because she failed to notify McCormick and Agricredit because, as the district
court correctly found, she did not learn that the notification did not occur until after the eight
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tractors/loaders were f1oored.

Instead, Bokides is suggesting that Roberta Shore should bring a

separate legal action against William Shore. Notwithstanding the fact that such a separate action
would be futile based upon the testimony and evidence, bringing a separate action against William
Shore, is not the equivalent ofBokides notifying McCormick and Agricredit to remove her from the
guarantees.
Bokides also cites to Theobaldv. Byers, 193 Cal.App 2d 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) and Lewis
v. Superior Court, 77 Cal.App. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), "for the proposition that in legal
malpractice actions, if there is a potential source of recovery for the plaintiff, then the recovery
against the defendant attorney is reduced or eliminated by the amount potentially recoverable."
While Lewis v. Superior Court held that "[ u]pon the trial of the matter defendant may seek establish
that plaintiff has a collectible interest in the pension," it still requires the defendant to meet his
burden of showing that a failure to mitigate damages. The same is true in this case where Bokides
"may seek to establish that" Roberta Shore has an alternative remedy which is viable and equivalent
at trial, but Bokides was unsuccessful in meeting his burden.
Over Roberta Shore's objection, the district court allowed Bokides to amend his answer to
pursue the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate but found that Roberta Shore's action were the
exercise of ordinary, due care. The district court properly relied upon Whitehouse v. Lange, 128
Idaho 129, 136,910 P.2d 801,808 (Ct.App. 1996), and found that:

Bokides did not present sufficient evidence at trial that Roberta's pursuit of
William would have lead to a collectible judgment that would have satisfied or
decreased her liability to McCormick. Rather the evidence at trial and this
Court's findings of fact support the opposite conclusion that it would only have
added to the already disastrous financial status of William and placed Roberta in line
with a handful of other creditors attempting to collect money and judgments against
him.
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(R. pg. 611 ) (emphasis added). Bokides simply did not meet his burden.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err in Holding that Roberta Shore's Actions were
Taken in the Exercise of Reasonable, Ordinary, Due Care.

Bokides makes a number of unsupported assertions which do not change or alter the findings
and conclusions ofthe district court. First, Bokides makes the unsupported assertion that there was
an impression that Roberta Shore and William Shore colluded to have Bokides pay the judgment
obtained by McCormick. Such an assertion is not supported by the evidence but also makes no sense
given the fact that it was the actions/inactions ofBokides that would have prevented Roberta Shore
from being sued in the first place, i.e., he was the one that agreed to send the notification.
Bokides then argues that because Roberta Shore and William Shore did not file any
opposition to the summary jUdgment motion of McCormick, it suggests they did not have any
motivation to avoid Bokides paying the entire amount. Again, there is no evidence in the record to
support such assertions, but the fact of the matter was that Roberta Shore did not have a meritorious
defense to McCormick's summary judgment motion given that she had not been removed from her
personal guarantee of the tractors/loaders financed by McCormick.
Bokides also argues that Robelia Shore failed to mitigate her damages because she did not
retain independent counsel to represent her. Bokides fails to mention the testimony and evidence
presented at trial that at the time McCormick initiated the lawsuit against her, she was advised of a
potential conflict and a written waiver of that conflict was obtained from both Roberta Shore and
William Shore. (Tr. pg. 21, Ins. 16-20). Prior to bringing a third party action against Bokides,
Roberta Shore independently determined not to make a claim against William Shore based upon her
personal knowledge of his assets, liabilities, including pending actions, and net worth. (Tr. pg. 21-22,
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Ins. 16-23; pgs. 27-28, Ins. 23-2). Thus, the same determination that the district court held was an
exercise of due care to not pursue an independent action against William Shore, was made before
Roberta Shore initiated a third party claim against Bokides. Moreover, Roberta Shore testified that
she asked Bokides if he thought it was okay for her to retain the same counsel as William Shore and
Bokides told her "he didn't see any reason not to, that that would be fine." (Tr. pg. 21, Ins. 1-15).
Thus, the very decision that Bokides is now second guessing was approved by Bokides according
to the testimony of Roberta Shore.
Bokides' assertion that Rule 1.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct \vould prevent
Roberta Shore from making a claim against William Shore is misplaced because Roberta Shore had
already made a knowing and intelligent decision not to pursue a claim against William Shore. i
Those actions were found to be an exercise of ordinary, due care and should not be disturbed on
appeal. Moreover, Roberta Shore testified that she understood that she could always hire a different
lawyer if and when she believed it would be productive to pursue William Shore. (Tr. pg. 6 L Ins.
3-22; pgs. 97-98, Ins. 22-3). Roberta Shore was not "legally handicapped from taking any steps to
pursue any claims against" William Shore as suggested by Bokides because, as she testified, she
"knew at any time, I could go hire any lawyer I want to hire to do whatever I want to do." (Tr. pg.
59, Ins. 14-22; pg. 61, Ins. 13-22).

J Bokides asserts that William Shore had a "clear, unequivocal obligation to both defend
and indemnify Roberta from any and all indebtedness from Bear River." Appellate's Brief, pg.
21. However, William Shore's obligations to Roberta Shore under the divorce decree were not
as clear and unequivocal as Bokides contends. William Shore had an obligation to indemnify
and defend for Bear River indebtedness. While the underlying transactions related to the
financing/flooring of Bear River equipment, Roberta Shore was sued by McCormick based upon
her "personal guaranty." Thus, the testimony and evidence at trial was that part of Roberta
Shore's decision included the expenses of pursuing William Shore, whether the claim was viable,
and then whether she would simply obtain an uncollectable judgment.
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Bokides plays "Monday Morning Quarterback" and suggests a number of actions Roberta
Shore "could have" taken.

However, speculating as to these steps is nothing more than second

guessing the trier of fact's decision. Again, the district court considered the testimony of Roberta
Shore and found her testimony credible as to her personal knowledge of the finances during her
fifteen year marriage and dissolution of that marriage and that she made a knowing and intelligent
decision. Speculation and second guessing actions Roberta Shore could have taken does not change
the fact that the trier of fact's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Perhaps the most obvious attempt of Bokides to re-argue the facts presented to the trier of
fact relates to Bokides' assertion that he "believes" the finances of William Shore were "most likely
understated." Appellate's Briel pg. 26. Bokides then speculates that William Shore's net worth was
understated because of William Shore' s mistaken assumptions as to his assets and personal I iabil ities
and "it is likely that there would be some assets from the bankruptcy estate to satisfy a portion of
McCormick's judgment.,,2 Appellate's Brief; pg. 28. However, the evidence concerning William
Shore's net worth was weighed and considered by the district court and the district court macle a
specific finding as to those assets and liabilities. See R. pgs. 604-605. Those findings, along with
Roberta Shore's personal knowledge of William Shore's net worth, are supported by substantial and
competent evidence and should not be overturned on appeal simply because Bokides speculates that

Bokides also speculates that William Shore's net worth may have decreased between
the time of McCormick's initial lawsuit, August 2008, and the time of trial, August 2010.
Again, the evidence presented to the district court was that Roberta Shore's decision not to
pursue William Shore was made prior to her bringing a third party action against Bokides. Thus,
it is not as if she waited two years to make her decision as suggested by Bokides. It should also
be noted that it took McCormick nearly two years to obtain a judgment against Roberta Shore
and William Shore based upon their personal guarantees and Bokides is simply speculating that
Roberta Shore could obtain ajudgment against William Shore in less time.
2
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they were undervalued.
Finally, Bokides raises a number of "what if' questions relating to the potential satisfaction
of the McCormick judgment. First, Bokides did not raise the issue below that the judgment obtained
by Roberta Shore against Bokides should be modified depending on the satisfaction of the
Iv1cCormick judgment. The appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal. Clear Springs Food. Inc. v. Spackman, 2011 LEXIS 44, 252 P.3D 71 (2011). Second, these
"what if' scenarios do not change the fact that McCormick has a judgment against Roberta Shore
as a direct and proximate result of the negligence/malpractice ofBokides. This is not disputed by
Bokides and he has raised no argument that his failure to send notifications to McCormick was not
the proximate cause of the judgment. (Tr. pgs. 188-189, Ins. 21-1). As the district court properly
concluded, the judgment against Roberta Shore was the proximate result of Bokides' breach and
thus she was damaged whcn the McCormick judgment was entered. 3
B.

The District Court Erred in Not Including the Tractor Floored Prior to the Divorce
Decree in the Judgment.
The district court failed to include the tractor f100red on October 23, 2006 because it was

11oOl'ed prior to the divorce being completed. The district court found that a reasonable time for
Bokides to notify McCormick and Agricredit to relieve Roberta Shore from her personal guarantee
obligations was six months or until the divorce decree was entered. However, Roberta Shore
suggests that a reasonable time for an ongoing business, with ongoing financing and f1ooring, is not
six months and the district court's decision that the tractor financed prior to the divorce decree was
not proximately caused by Bokides' breach should be reversed.

The McCormick judgment was entered against Roberta Shore prior to the trial in this
matter and prior to the district court's decision.
3
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The district court found that during one of the meetings between Roberta Shore and Bokides,
the last of which \vas May of 2006, Bokides agreed to notify McCormick and Agricredit of her
decision to terminate the personal guarantees. It is undisputed that Bokides failed to provide such
notification. Approximately six months later the divorce was completed the divorce decree was
entered on November 16,2006. Of the eight tractors/loaders which McCormick sued Roberta Shore
on her personal guarantee, only one was financedlfloored prior to the divorce decree. This tractor
was financedlfloored on October 23,2006 and the sum claimed by McCormick relative to this tractor
was $43,331.89.
As to when the notification would occur, the district court found that Roberta Shore did not
see why the notification could not occur immediately and that she expected the notification to be
done by the time the divorce was completed. (R. pg. 603). Bokides suggested that the notification
would not be until the divorce was finalized but the district court held that it did not accept Bokides'
version of the events, but instead found Roberta Shore's testimony more credible.

CR.

pg. 603,

footnote 4). Thus, the district court's own findings were that the there was no reason why the
notification could not occur immediately and it would be done by the time the divorce was
completed. Yet, the district court found that a tractor floored five months after Bokides agreed to
send the notification, and less than four weeks before the divorce was completed, was not included
in Roberta Shore's damages. In other words, the district court's findings suggest that a reasonable
time for Bokides to send the notification was anytime prior to the divorce being completed,
November 16, 2006.
The district court relied upon Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho
299,318,233 P .3d 1221, 1240 (2010) which holds that where no time of performance is stated, the
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law implies a reasonable time. However, Roberta Shore contends that a reasonable time under these
circumstances was not six months later or when the divorce decree was entered. Bear River was
continuously in the business offinancing, flooring and selling tractors, loaders and other equipment
during the divorce proceedings. Because of the continuous, ongoing business and financing, it was
important for Roberta Shore to be removed from her personal guarantee as soon as possible. The
business was being managed by an individual named Tom Lewis and Roberta Shore had no way of
knowing when and how many tractors/loaders were being floored and financed. (Tr. pgs. 32-33, Ins.
21-10). The divorce litigation could have taken three months or three years and it was completely
arbitrary to select the divorce decree as the implied time of performance. A reasonable time should
have been no more than sixty (60) days but in no event as long as six months. Even if Bokides were
allowed one-hundred twenty (120) days, Roberta Shore would have no liability to
McCormick/Agricredit.
Again, the district court's own findings were that Roberta Shore's testimony was more

credible than Bokides and that she did not see why the notification was not immediately provided
or at least prior to the divorce being completed. In fact, Roberta Shore testified that she understood
that Bokides would provide the notifications as soon as he could, there was no condition as to when
he would do it and that she assumed he would proceed "promptly." (Tr. pgs. 13-15, Ins. 19 -11).
She testified there "was no reason to hold offon it. Uhm, I didn't see why it should have been done
right away, but we didn't discuss it." (Tr. pg. 44, Ins. 9-15). The expectation of the witness in which
the trier of fact found most credible was that it would be done promptly and right away and not six
months later when the di vorce was final. In fact, Robelia Shore testified that there was no discussion
about waiting until the divorce decree was entered to send the notifications. (Tr. pg. 19, Ins. 6-22;
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pg. 45, Ins. 2-6).

Finally, Roberta Shore testified that if Bokides would have provided the

notification in a reasonable time, "even as late as September 2006", McCormick would not have
sued her. (Tr. pgs. 30-31, Ins. 11-6).
F or these reasons, Roberta Shore respectfully requests that the district court's decision be
reversed as to the one tractor financed prior to the divorce decree. Even if there were no indications
of trouble with Bear River, a reasonable time under the law to notify McCormick/Agricredit that
Roberta Shore intended to revoke her personal guarantee for flooring lines of Bear River equipment
is certainly less than five months. There was no reasonable, rational reason not to remove Roberta
Shore from the personal guarantees as soon as possible following the May 2006 agreement to do so
which in no event should have taken until October 23, 2006 (the day the only tractor was t1oOl'ed
prior to the entry of the divorce decree).
C.

Roberta Shore is Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal.
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41, Roberta Shore requests attorney fees and costs

be awarded to her on appeaL

With regard to attorney fees, Roberta Shore claims attorney fees under

I.e. § 12-120(3), which provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
(emphasis added).
The statute goes on to define commercial transaction as follows: "(tJhe term 'commercial
transaction' is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes."

I.e. § 12-120(3).
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In City o/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court
overruled the decision in Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 425,807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991) and held
that I.e. § 12-120(3) applies to legal malpractice actions. The Court reasoned that the latter part of
the statute is not limited to contract actions and only requires that there be a commercial transaction.

ld. at 665,201 P.3d at 638. Thus, the fact that although a legal malpractice action may sound in tort,
attorney fees are awardable under I.C. § 12-120(3) if the underlying matter involved a commercial
transaction.
In this case, in the underlying matter, Plaintiff, McCormick, made certain claims, and
ultimately obtained a judgment, against Roberta Shore based upon her guaranty.

The guaranty

related to the flooring lines of tractors and other equipment sold for commercial purposes by Bear
River. The judgment against Roberta Shore was based upon a commercial transaction, and the
district court awarded attorney fees against Roberta Shore, and in favor of McCormick. in the
underlying action, for these reasons (R. pg. 468).

The very guaranty that forms the basis of

McCormick's cause of action against Roberta Shore is also the basis of the legal malpractice action
against Bokides. Accordingly, Roberta Shore's cause of action against Bokides based upon is failure
to remove her from said personal guarantees is based upon a commercial transaction. Indeed,
Bokides does not dispute that the this action is based upon a commercial transaction as Bokides as
also claimed attorney fees on appeal for the same reasons.4
Once a cause of action is brought which is covered by 1. C. § 12-120(3), the award of attorney
fees is mandatory. Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 952 P.2d 914 (CLApp. 1998).

4 It should be noted that the district court awarded attorney fees to Roberta Shore based
upon I.e. § 12-120(3) and Bokides did not appeal any portion of the district court's decision and
supplemental judgment pertaining to attorney fees.
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The mandatory award of attorney fees in this case is consistent with Idaho precedent holding that

I.e. § 12-120(3) is applicable when the underlying debt is based upon an open account, note, bill,
contract, or any other commercial transaction covered by I. C. § 12-120(3). See Durrant v. Quality

First /vfarketing, Inc., 127 Idaho 558, 903 P.2d 147 (Ct.App. 1995) (awarding attorney fees to the
prevailing party pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) in an action to pierce the corporate veil when the
underlying action and debt upon which the plaintiff sought to hold the principal individually liable
was either an open account, note. bilL contract or commercial transaction covered by I.C. § 12-

120(3); A/pine Packing Company v. HH Keim Company, Limited, 121 Idaho 762,828 P.2d 325
(CLApp. 1991) (holding that attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) were appropriately awardable to
the prevailing party when one party sought to disregard a corporate entity to avoid collection on an
open account).
VI. CONCLUSION
F or the foregoing reasons, Roberta Shore respectfully requests that the district court's
decision be affirmed with regard to its decision to Roberta Shore did not fail to mitigate her
damages. The district court's decision that her actions were reasonable and with the exercise of due
care are supported by substantial evidence.
Roberta Shore also respectfully requests that the district court's decision be reversed with
respect to its decision that a reasonable amount of time for Bokides to notify McCormick and
Agricredit to remove Roberta Shore from her guarantees was nearly six months later when the
divorce was final. Accordingly, Roberta Shore requests reversal of the district court's decision to
disallow her claim for damages relating to the tractor which was financed prior to the divorce being
completed. Lastly, Robe11a Shore respectfully requests her attorney fees and costs incurred in this
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appeal.
DATED this ------''''-'''-_ day of August, 20 1l.
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Charles Edwards Cather III
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420 Memorial Drive
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